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Abstract:  
Most natural commons are subject to discontinuities and threshold effects, so their 
gradual depletion may result in a sudden irreversible loss of the associated ecological 
services. Yet, it is often impossible to locate these thresholds with certainty. We analyze 
this context using a variant of the divide-the-dollar game, in which the amount to be split 
among players follows a discrete or multimodal probability distribution. “Cautions 
equilibria” – where agents collectively behave as if the worst-case scenario were certain 
– are found to coexist with “dangerous equilibria” – where overall demand for ecological 
services might lead to their collapse – and “dreadful equilibria” – where agents 
collectively request so much natural capital that a collapse of ecological services is 
certain, even if all agents are risk averse. Communication/cooperation among agents, 
however, which raises the possibility of coordinated group deviations, would eliminate 
dreadful equilibria and reduce the occurrence of dangerous equilibria, while cautions 
equilibria are robust to such deviations. A direct corollary is that dangerous equilibria are 
Pareto-dominated by any cautions equilibrium in which all agents claim less natural 
capital. These results shed light on the management of common-pool resources, 
international climate change negotiations, and the implementation of precautionary 
policies. 
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1 Introduction
Human societies rely on a number of indispensable ecological services, such as water
purification, livestock support, flood prevention, waste recycling, climate stability,
erosion avoidance and fresh air, for their economic activities and wellbeing. These
services are provided by forests, lakes, coral reefs, savannas, wetlands, oceans, the
troposphere and other ecosystems which typically are ‘common-pool resources,’ i.e.
resources “(...) from which it is diﬃcult to exclude or limit users once the resource
is provided, and one person’s consumption of resource units makes those units un-
available to others” (Ostrom 1999, p. 497). The impossibility to exclude potential
beneficiaries while there are inevitable capacity constraints (at least in the short run)
makes such ecosystems, and the corresponding ecological services, particularly prone
to a ‘tragedy of the commons.’
Over the last decades, significant research eﬀorts have considered how human
societies can, and actually do, cope with this problem.1 Taking stock of this literature,
this paper now builds on two well-documented additional observations. First, the
provision of ecological services is subject to discontinuities, bifurcations or threshold
eﬀects that may show up rather abruptly, following persistent abuses of the involved
ecosystems (Scheﬀer et al. 2001). In agriculture, for example, it is often the case
that “(...) no perceptible change in the environmental state occurs unless a specified
farming practice is applied with a minimal intensity and on a minimal area in the
zone of interest” (Dupraz et al. 2009, p. 613). In the literature on biodiversity, the
so-called ‘rivet hypothesis’ (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; Lawton 1993) alleges that:
(...) the functions of species in ecosystems can be analogous to the func-
tions of rivets in an airplane. Both systems can aﬀord continual extraction
of its constituent components without experimenting a loss of function.
However, after a certain point this capacity is lost and only one additional
species extinction (rivet popped) may cause a collapse in the functional
properties of the system.2
1For an exhaustive literature survey and appraisal, see Elinor Ostrom (2010)’s lecture, delivered
when she received the 2009 Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.
2This statement is drawn from Muradian (2001, p. 11)’s benchmark discussion of ecological
thresholds.
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Secondly, the inherent complexity of ecosystems renders the assessment of discrete
thresholds usually uncertain. Continual nutrient loading to a lake, for instance, can
cause an abrupt move to a turbid state once a certain nutrient concentration has
been reached, but the precise turning point also depends on occasional events like
droughts and storms which are essentially random (Bachmann et al. 1999). This
illustrates the general fact that ecological data will often be quite noisy, so modelling
the mechanisms underlying regime shifts and testing the existence of a threshold can
pose real theoretical and statistical challenges.3
Most economic analyses of natural commons involving uncertainty, regime shifts
and strategic interaction have done so in a public good provision context (see, e.g.,
Boucher and Bramoullé 2010, and the references therein). Sandler and Sterbenz
(1990), then Perrings and Pearce (1994), were the first to deal with a non-excludable
but rival good subject to uncertain thresholds.4 The former looked at the exploita-
tion of a stock resource, showing that uncertainty about the size of the stock will lead
risk-averse firms to reduce their exploitation eﬀort compared to what would happen
under certainty. The latter considered the preservation of biodiversity, recommend-
ing (in a manner consistent with risk averse behavior) that economic activity be
reduced further when the location of an ecological threshold is uncertain. Recently,
Bramoullé and Treich (2009) studied the eﬀect of uncertainty in a global commons
situation. They show that emissions will be lower under uncertainty than under cer-
tainty (because polluters are risk averse), so uncertainty can have a positive eﬀect
on welfare. They also point out that agents will cooperate less under uncertainty, as
cooperation yields lower rewards. This conclusion provides additional motivation for
Dupraz et al. (2009), who explicitly seek means to overcome lack of participation in
agri-environmental programs.
These works draw attention to certain exogenous characteristics of agents, such
as risk aversion, willingness-to-pay and private information, in driving the outcome.
Although these certainly are important items (which we come back to in the closing
sections of this paper) in understanding the conservation or depletion of common-
3For a discussion of this general point, together with an overview and appraisal of available
statistical methods, see Andersen et al. (2008).
4Experimental game theorists and psychologists have also examined this situation since at least
Suleiman and Rapoport (1988)’s article.
4
pool resources, we will rather emphasize here the role of interaction, endogenous
communication and cooperation between agents in the presence of a specific, yet
rather plausible, type of uncertainty. This is actually a ‘classical topic’ in the lit-
erature on common-pool resources. It has been extensively examined by means of
experiments, notably with games quite similar to the one used in this paper (see,
e.g., Budescu et al. 1995). The experimental approach, however, must necessarily
assume peculiar utility functions and probability distributions. In particular, multi-
modal distributions, like the ones introduced here to represent scientific uncertainty
about discrete thresholds, were excluded, which rules out multiple equilibria of the
‘cautious/dangerous/dreadful’ sort we study below.
To be precise, our model amends the well-known Nash demand game (Nash 1950;
Malueg 2009), also called the ‘Divide-the-dollar game,’ by supposing that symmetri-
cally informed players are splitting an uncertain amount (of natural capital) which
follows a discrete or multimodal probability distribution. This setting seems to cap-
ture a number of stylized situations: in climate change negotiations, for instance,
parties normally focus on a finite number of collective targets, such as 550 parts per
million (ppm) of carbon dioxide (CO2)-equivalent - a politically sensible objective
that many think is unlikely to prevent major environmental disruptions, 450 ppm -
which may limit global warming to a manageable level (thought to be 2◦C), or 350
ppm - which some scientists and vulnerable countries regard as the upper bound on
emissions that guarantees the preservation of the present biosphere.
In contrast with results in the previous literature, this type of uncertainty does not
always lead to lower collective demand for natural capital, even when all agents are
risk averse: ‘cautious equilibria’ - where agents altogether behave as if the worst-case
scenario were certain - are found to coexist with ‘dangerous equilibria’ - where the
overall request of ecological services might lead to their collapse - and even ‘dreadful
equilibria’ - where agents collectively claim so much of the resource that no unilateral
deviation by one agent can stop its exhaustion. We next bring in the (realistic)
possibility that agents communicate and cooperate via group deviations (formally,
this means we use the strong and coalition-proof equilibrium concepts developed by
Aumann 1959, and Bernheim et al. 1987, respectively). As expected, this readily
rules out dreadful equilibria. Somewhat less predictable, however, is the fact that
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dangerous equilibria may be vulnerable to group deviations, while cautious equilibria
are not. Actually, dangerous equilibria are not coalition-proof when certain cautious
equilibria exist. The upshot is that any cautious equilibrium is eﬃcient and Pareto-
dominates all dangerous equilibria that can be reached from it while increasing every
agent’s claim on natural capital.
These results are initially derived with only two possible ceilings. We show later
on that they are qualitatively robust to the presence of an arbitrary finite number
of potential thresholds. They hold as well if uncertainty concerning the location of
thresholds is captured by a continuous but multimodal probability distribution. The
latter situation may reflect the fact that the models and approaches around which
scientists tend to cluster oﬀer diﬀerent confidence intervals or probability distributions
rather than point estimates. Multimodal probability distributions are also likely to
emerge in climate change policy discussions (see Jones 2003, and Moss and Schneider
2000), from the aggregation of experts’ opinions and the Bayesian updating practiced
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
On a policy note, these findings support the creation of institutions and governance
mechanisms which enhance communication between users of natural commons: for
as long as agents can identify a cautious equilibrium in which they all consume less
than in the current state, they should cooperate in moving to this precautionary,
yet more eﬃcient, situation. As the derivation of our results will show, however,
a lower threshold will invite such a move only if the probability associated with it
is suﬃciently large; the collective adoption of a costly precautionary stance seems
therefore robust to the existence of doomsayers.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The upcoming section lays out the
mathematical notation and basic model. Section 3 presents and proves our main
propositions. Section 4 checks their robustness and generality. Section 5 discusses
some of their policy implications. Section 6 brings some concluding remarks.
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2 The basic model
Consider a finite set  = {1  } of agents (which can be firms, individuals or
countries) who must simultaneously decide how much of a natural capital, measured
in positive real numbers, they will claim for themselves. Overall demand is sustainable
up to a limit, but scientists disagree on the tipping point beyond which the available
resource would collapse to 0. To keep matters simple (generalizations will be made
in Section 4), suppose some experts set the ceiling on total demand at 1 while others
deem it to be  ∈ (0 1). These point estimates are given consensual and common-
knowledge probabilities  and (1− ) respectively.
Denote  an agent ’s claim, demand or request (we use these terms interchange-
ably throughout the paper) on natural capital,  = () a request vector or profile,
 = P  total demand, and − = P 6=  the sum of all agents’ claims except
agent ’s. The utility an agent  derives from being delivered her request  is given
by (), where the function (·) is concave (so agents can be risk averse or risk
neutral) and nondecreasing. Reaching this consumption level is of course conditional
on total demand not exceeding the ecological threshold; otherwise each agent gets
(0) = 0.
Concretely,  might correspond, for example, to a farming area encroaching on
some endangered key species’ habitat, a certain flow of wastewater being dumped into
a lake, a quantity of fish caught, or some level of carbon dioxide emissions accruing
into the atmosphere. This brings agent  a positive utility level (), provided an
underlying key ecological service - in these cases, land fertility, water purification,
livestock renewal, or stable weather, respectively - is maintained. Otherwise, agent
’s utility level drops to 0.
Agent ’s expected payoﬀ in this amended divide-the-dollar game is now given by
(−) = ()I( ≤ ) + ()I(   ≤ 1) , (1)
where I(·) indicates whether the condition within parenthesis holds (= 1) or not (= 0).
This completes the description of the model, so we can proceed to the derivation of
our main results.
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3 Main results
We shall now look first at the Nash equilibria of this simple game. These equilibria will
next be put to the test of stronger equilibrium concepts - respectively the notions of
strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria - which allow for group as well as individual
deviations.
3.1 Nash equilibria
Using the current notation, one can characterize an agent ’s best response strategy
as follows.
First, let −  , so the other agents are asking for more than the lower resource
cap :
a) If − ≤ 1, then agent  will claim  = 1 − −. She can indeed do no
better than request natural capital up to the upper (risky) ceiling 1, since the
remaining agents’ overall demand is already higher than the safe threshold .
b) If −  1, however, agent  can claim any amount  ≥ 0, since everybody will
end up losing the ecological services anyway.
Next, let − ≤ , so the other agents are asking for less than the inferior limit :
a) If ( − −) ≥ (1 − −), then agent  does best by claiming  =  −
−. Requesting the safe amount −− in this case yields more utility than
demanding the best (but risky) alternative 1−−.
b) If (−−)  (1−−), however, agent  should then go for  = 1−−.
This description of best-response strategies shows that three sorts of Nash equilib-
ria are possible: (1) cautious equilibria, in which agents collectively set total demand
at the highest secure level  = ; (2) dangerous equilibria, where agents altogether
request natural capital up to the risky upper ceiling  = 1 and face a probability
1−  of exhausting the resource; and dreadful equilibria, wherein everyone’s claim on
ecological services is so high (i.e. −  1 for all ) that no individual adjustment
can avoid their collapse.
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Note that no Nash equilibrium exists in which agents collectively ask for an amount
of natural capital lower than  or strictly between  and 1.
Moreover, cautious, dangerous and dreadful Nash equilibria can coexist, despite
the fact that all agents are risk averse. This contrasts with the findings reported so
far in the literature (see Bramoullé and Treich 2009, for example). The simultaneous
presence of these equilibria is also unlikely to be accidental, as the following simple
example suggests.
Example 1. Let there be only two agents, with identical utility function () = √
for  = 1 2. Suppose  = 08 and  = 08. The strategy profile  = (05 05) is a
dangerous equilibrium because (05 05) = 07 · 08 = 056  (03 05) = 054 for
 = 1 2. At the same time, the profile 0 = (04 04) is a cautious equilibrium, since
(04 04) = 063  (06 04) = 077 · 08 = 062 for  = 1 2; and 00 = (15 15) is
also clearly an equilibrium, a dreadful one which brings each agent’s payoﬀ to 0.5
In order to grasp the conditions underlying the existence of each type of Nash
equilibria, we need to introduce an extra piece of notation. Let 0 ≤   ≤  refer to
the cut-oﬀ demand level such that
(−−)  (1−−) if −   
(−−)  (1−−) if −     (2)
This allows to make the following preliminary statement.
Lemma 1. For all i, there is always a unique cut-oﬀ value.
Proof. Let (−) ≡ (−−)−(1−−) Clearly,  0 = −0(−−)+0(1−
−)  0 since the function  is concave. When (0) is negative or 0, one can
set ¯ = 0 If (0) is positive, the fact that ()  0 and () is decreasing and
continuous entails that there is a unique ¯  0 such that (¯) = 0, (−)  0 if
−  ¯, and (−)  0 if −  ¯
5Although we exclude such risk attitudes, note that all three types of equilibria could exist as
well with risk-loving agents. To see this, suppose that  = 1 2, () = 2 ,  = 04 and  = 08.
One can check that  = (05 05) is a dangerous equilibrium, 0 = (04 04) is again a cautious one,
and 00 = (15 15) is a dreadful equilibrium.
9
The following proposition will now indicate when there always exists at least one
cautious or one dangerous equilibrium, and when both types of equilibria actually
coexist.
Proposition 1. The game always admits at least one equilibrium which is not dread-
ful. More precisely,
i) There is a cautious equilibrium if and only if
P
∈ ¯ ≥ (− 1) ;
ii) There is a dangerous equilibrium if and only if
P
∈ ¯ ≤ − 1 ;
iii) Both cautious and dangerous equilibria will coexist if and only if
(− 1) ≤P∈ ¯ ≤ − 1 .
Proof. Part (i): By the above description of best-response strategies, a strategy profile
 is a cautious equilibrium if and only if(
− ≤ ¯ for all  ∈ P
  = 
(3)
Using the fact that − =  −  and adding up all the inequalities in (3), we have
that
P
 ¯ ≥ (− 1). Conversely, if
P
 ¯ ≥ (− 1), one can always find a vector
 which satisfies (3).
Part (ii): Similarly, a strategy profile  is a dangerous equilibrium if and only if( − ≥ ¯ for all  ∈ P
  = 1
(4)
Using the fact that − = 1 −  and adding up all the inequalities in (4), we have
that
P
 ¯ ≤  − 1. Conversely, if
P
 ¯ ≤  − 1, one can always find a vector 
which satisfies (4).
Part (iii) follows trivially.
Figure 1 illustrates the sets of equilibria predicted in the proposition, in the two-
agent case. These sets depend on the location of the cut-oﬀs ¯, which in turn
depends on the lower bound , the probability , and the agents’ respective utility
functions (·).
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Figure 1: The two-agent case.
If agent  becomes more risk averse (so the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion
00 (·)0(·) uniformly increases, say), the cut-oﬀ ¯ increases because a secure amount
of resources ( − −) now yields relatively more utility than the higher but risky
amount (1−−). From proposition 1, one infers that the set of cautious equilibria
expands while the set of dangerous equilibria shrinks.
A decrease in the probability  that the actual threshold on ecological services is
at 1 instead of  leads to the same conclusion, for ¯ must then go up.
Finally, consider an increase of the lower threshold from level  to level 0. Since
(0  ¯(  ))  0, we have that ¯(0  )  ¯(  ). This means that
the set of dangerous equilibria gets smaller. However, the set of cautious equilibria
might not expand: by proposition 1, this will happen if and only if
P
 ¯−(0 )−P
 ¯−( )  0 −  .
From these brief remarks about comparative statics, we shall now move on to
examine what happens to the above Nash equilibria when group deviations (and not
just individual ones) are permitted.
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3.2 Allowing for communication and cooperation
Users of common-pool resources can normally communicate, negotiate and act col-
lectively. Standard Nash equilibria a priori discard this behavior, so one may cast
doubts about their plausibility in the present context.6 A direct consequence of al-
lowing agents to talk to each other and eventually collude could be, for instance,
that subgroups may form in which members prefer to jointly move away from some
Nash equilibrium. This section will now examine whether the three types of equilibria
defined above are immune to such deviations.
Recall that a Nash equilibrium  is strong if there is no alternative strategy profile
0 ∈ R+ such that (0) ≥ () for all agents  belonging to a subcoalition  ⊆  , the
inequality being strict for at least one , and 0 =  for all the outsiders  ∈ \ .
The following proposition determines whether dreadful and cautious equilibria are
strong in this sense.
Proposition 2. Cautious Nash equilibria are strong, but dreadful Nash equilibria are
not.
Proof. From a dreadful equilibrium, any group deviation leading to a cautious or a
dangerous strategy profile, be it a deviation by the entire set of players, obviously
brings a higher payoﬀ to all agents in the coalition. Hence, dreadful equilibria are not
strong Nash equilibria.
The proof that cautious equilibria are strong Nash equilibria proceeds by contra-
diction. Let  ∈ R+ be a cautious Nash equilibrium, and suppose there exists another
strategy profile 0 and a coalition  ⊆  such that 0 =  for all  ∈  , (0)  ()
for some  ∈  , and (0) ≥ () for all  ∈  . Since the utility functions ’s are in-
creasing, it must be the case that
P
∈ 0 
P
∈  and 0 ≥  for all  ∈  . Now,
consider an agent  ∈  such that 0−  −. For this agent, demanding 0 = − 0−
or less leads to a lower payoﬀ than before; her best response must be 0 = 1− 0−.
We then have that (0 0−) = (1− 0− 0−)  (1−−−) ≤ (), where
6Quoting Ostrom (2010, p. 648), for instance, on why the prisoner’s dilemma game might not
fully capture what goes on in the sharing of common-pool resources: “Public investigators purposely
keep prisoners separated so they cannot communicate. The users of a common-pool resource are not
so limited.”
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the last inequality holds because  is a Nash equilibrium. Agent  is thus worse oﬀ
under 0 than under , which contradicts the initial assertion.
This proposition entails that all cautious equilibria are Pareto eﬃcient. Further-
more, any cautious equilibrium Pareto-dominates all dreadful ones. The status of
dangerous equilibria is not so clear-cut, however. To analyze it, we shall invoke a
weaker equilibrium notion which forbids certain improbable group deviations. Let
us call a group deviation self-enforcing if it is not itself exposed to improving sub-
group deviations. Following Bernheim et al. (1987), a Nash equilibrium is said to
be coalition-proof if no self-enforcing group deviation can deliver an outcome that is
Pareto improving.7 Clearly, any strong Nash equilibrium (hence any cautious equi-
librium, by the last proposition) is coalition-proof. A reconsideration of dangerous
equilibria is now at hand.
Proposition 3. Let the strategy profile  be a dangerous equilibrium. If there is a
cautious equilibrium 0 such that, for some subset  ⊆  ,
0 =  −  for all  ∈  , and
0 =  for all  ∈ 
(5)
with  ≥ 0 for all  ∈  and P  = 1− , then  is not coalition-proof.
Proof. Suppose a dangerous equilibrium  is coalition-proof, but that there is a cau-
tious equilibrium 0 verifying condition (5). For all  ∈  , we have that
(0) ≥ (0 + 1− )
= ( +
X
 6=
)
 ()
The first inequality holds because 0 is itself a Nash equilibrium. The second (strict)
inequality follows from the fact that
P
 6=   0, for
P
 6=  = 0 would mean
7The formal definition of coalition-proofness (which can be found in Bernheim et al. 1987, or
in Moreno and Wooders 1996) is recursive and involves heavy notation that we chose to spare the
reader. The application made here of this equilibrium concept is anyhow rather straightforward.
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that  is not a Nash equilibrium (since the cautious equilibrium 0 could then be
reached from it through a unilateral move by agent ). Now, 0 being a strong Nash
equilibrium by proposition 2, it constitutes a self-enforcing group deviation from .
Hence,  cannot be coalition-proof.
Note that condition (5) does not always hold. Suppose, for example, that we
have three agents whose preferences are such that ¯1 = ¯2 = ¯3 = 23 , with   34 .
One can see that  = (0 1
2
 1
2
) is a dangerous equilibrium while 0 = (
3
 
3
 
3
) is a
cautious one. Yet, (5) does not apply to this pair. The important upshot is that
coalition-proof dangerous and cautious equilibria can coexist. This also suggests that
some dangerous equilibria which are not coalition-proof may not verify condition (5),
as the following example shows.
Example 2. Let us add a third identical player to the previous Example 1 where
 = 08,  = 08, and  ≡ √·. Clearly, the request profile  = (12  12  0) is a dan-
gerous equilibrium since (1
2
 1
2
) was a dangerous equilibrium in the two-agent game.
A profitable deviation for coalition  = {1 2} is to demand (04 04); this devia-
tion is self-enforcing since (04 04) was a cautious equilibrium in the earlier game.
But 0 = (04 04 0) is not a cautious equilibrium because the third agent can cer-
tainly gain by asking for a share of natural capital larger than zero. Hence,  is not
coalition-proof even though no cautious equilibrium verifying expression (5) exists.
This example illustrates the well-known shortcoming of coalition-proofness: a self-
enforcing group deviation may be exposed to some outsiders repositioning. More
importantly, it also suggests (as Figure 1 somewhat does) that a group deviation
from a dangerous to a cautious equilibrium can only occur when claims on natural
capital are ‘not too asymmetric’ across agents. This observation has ramifications for
public policy and climate change negotiations that will be briefly discussed in Section
5. Beforehand, we will first check the robustness of the results just shown.
4 Extensions
The game considered so far had only two thresholds. This section will now successively
contemplate a situation with multiple thresholds and one with a continuum of possible
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thresholds randomly spread according to a multimodal probability distribution. The
former case could stem from greater disagreement among experts, the latter from
acknowledging measurement errors and aggregating various interval or probabilistic
estimates (instead of point estimates) of thresholds. Our analysis will proceed as in
the previous section and will produce qualitatively similar results.
4.1 Multiple thresholds
Suppose the predicted ecological thresholds, according to a group of experts or models,
now belong to a finite set,  = {1  } ⊂ R+. The ecosystem capacity is then
either 1  0 with probability 1, 2  1 with probability 2,..., or   −1 with
probability  = 1− 1 − 2 − − −1.
As before, let each agent  = 1  claim an amount  ≥ 0 of ecological services.
If all claims add up to less than or exactly the actual threshold, agent ’s demand, ,
is met. On the other hand, if the sum, , of all demands exceeds the true capacity,
every agent gets 0. Let ¯ =P= ; agent ’s expected payoﬀ is given by
(−) = ()I( ≤ 1) +  + ¯()I(−1   ≤ ) (6)
Proceeding as we did in Section 3, let ¯ with  ∈  and  = 1 − 1 denote
the cut-oﬀ values defined as:
¯( −−)  ¯+1(+1 −−) if −  ¯
¯( −−)  ¯+1(+1 −−) if −  ¯
(7)
The following statement is a generalization of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. The cut-oﬀs of each agent  follow the natural order:
0 = ¯0 ≤ ¯1 ≤ ¯2 ≤  ≤ ¯−1 ≤ ¯ = .
Hence, demanding  = −− is the best response to − ∈ [¯−1  ¯ ]
Proof. See the appendix.
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Let us now call cautious a Nash equilibrium strategy profile ∗ where∗ = P
=1
∗ =
1, h-dangerous a Nash equilibrium in which ∗ = , and dreadful a Nash equilib-
rium where ∗   . Conditions that guarantee the existence of these equilibria are
given below.
Proposition 4. The game always admits at least one non-dreadful equilibrium. Fur-
thermore,
1) A cautious equilibrium exists if and only if
P
∈ ¯1 ≥ (− 1)1;
2) For any  ∈ {2 }, an −dangerous equilibrium exists if and only ifX
∈
¯−1 ≤ (− 1) ≤
X
∈
¯
This proposition implies that cautious and all -dangerous equilibria may coexist.
The underlying argument matches the one used in the proof of proposition 1.
The possibility of group deviations would again make dreadful equilibria and cer-
tain dangerous equilibria untenable. The following statements are straightforward
extensions of propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 5. Cautious Nash equilibria are strong; dreadful Nash equilibria are not.
Proposition 6. Let a strategy profile  be an h-dangerous equilibrium. If there is an
0-dangerous equilibrium 0, 0  , such that for a subgroup  ⊆  ,
0 =  −  for all  ∈  , and
0 =  for all  ∈ 
with  ≥ 0 for all  ∈  and P  = 1− 0 , then  is not coalition-proof.
More clearly than its counterpart in section 3, the latter proposition conveys a
notion of gradualism (which may matter, for instance, in international climate policy
negotiations). The 0-equilibrium that a group of agents would prefer to the riskier
-equilibrium may not itself be coalition-proof. In this case, one can imagine that
another deviation to an even safer 00-equilibrium might occur, and so on, until a
cautious equilibrium is reached.
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We shall now show that these results do not depend (qualitatively, at least) on
having the natural threshold take only a finite number of possible values.
4.2 Continuous (multimodal) distributions of thresholds
Consider now a situation where the ceiling on ecological services  is located according
to a common-knowledge distribution function  (·) with density (·) such that  (0) =
0. We view  (·) as an aggregate of various interval or probabilistic estimates of an
ecological threshold and assume it is multimodal.
Again, let each agent  = 1  make a claim  ≥ 0 on natural capital. If the
sum of individual demands amounts to no more than , all requests  are satisfied;
otherwise, everybody gets 0. The probability of not exceeding the threshold being
given by 1−  (), agent ’s expected payoﬀ is then
(−) = ()(1−  ( +−)) (8)
Notice first that this payoﬀ function can have several local maxima. The first-order
necessary condition for maximizing agent ’s payoﬀ is given by
0()
() =
( +−)
1−  ( +−) (9)
The left-hand side of this expression increases with . The right-hand side is the
inverse of the so-called hazard rate. The literature on mechanism design (see, e.g.,
Bulow and Roberts 1989; Levin 1997) usually assumes the latter to be monotonically
decreasing. Here, the fact  (·) is multimodal may cause it to be non-monotonic, since
between two suﬃciently far oﬀ predictions the density (·) will first decline and then
grow sharply. This may indeed create multiple local maxima.
In this context, let us call a Nash equilibrium cautious (dangerous) when total
demand is at the lowest (highest) level. Both types of equilibria may coexist, even in
this continuous framework, as the following examples illustrate. A notable diﬀerence
with the discrete case is that there can be only one Nash equilibrium of a kind.
Example 3. Suppose there are three agents with identical utility function () =√,  = 1 2 3. Let the distribution of thresholds  (·) be the weighted sum of two
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diﬀerent expert assessments: the first one is a normal distribution with mean equal
to 8 and variance equal to 1, the second is also a normal distribution with mean
18 and variance 1. The respective weights put on the former and the latter are 08
and 02. Two symmetric Nash equilibria will coexist in this case: one (the cautious
equilibrium) in which an agent claims an amount 2325 of natural capital, and the
other (the dangerous equilibrium) in which an agent requests 5421.
Example 4. Using the same bimodal distribution as in example 3, suppose there are
now three risk-neutral agents with identical utility function () = ∗,  = 1 2 3.
Again, two symmetric equilibria will coexist in this game: in the cautious equilibrium
an agent claims an amount 247 of ecological services, in the dangerous equilibrium
an agent demands 555.
These examples also reveal that, contrary to what happens when there is a finite
number of possible thresholds, overall demand for natural capital changes with the
agents’ degree of risk aversion. In both the cautious and the dangerous equilibrium,
claims are actually lower (as expected) when agents are more risk averse.
As the next proposition shows, finally, the cautious equilibrium in this continuous
setting is still a strong Nash equilibrium; it dominates any dangerous equilibrium in
which every agent makes a bigger claim.
Proposition 7. The cautious equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium. It Pareto-
dominates any dangerous equilibrium in which everyone asks for more natural capital.
Proof. The argument for the first part mimics that for proposition 2. Denote by  the
cautious equilibrium of the game. Consider another equilibrium, 0, to be the result
of a profitable deviation by coalition  ⊆  . Clearly | | ≥ 2, or  would not be a
Nash equilibrium of the game. Also, it must be that  0 6= . Suppose  0  , and
consider an agent  ∈  such that  0−  − Such an agent exist because | | ≥ 2.
Denote by ∗( 0−) agent ’s best response to all other agents collectively demanding
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 0−. By the monotonicity of , it must be that
(0 0−) ≤ (∗( 0−) 0−)
= (∗( 0−))× (1−  (∗( 0−) + 0−))
 (∗( 0−) + 0− −−)× (1−  (∗( 0−) + 0−))
= (∗( 0−) + 0− −−−)
≤ ( −)
with the last inequality coming from the fact that  is a Nash equilibrium of the
game. A cautious equilibrium being a Nash equilibrium with the lowest total demand
by definition, the case  0   cannot happen.
To prove the second part, denote by  the cautious equilibrium of the game and
by 0 a dangerous equilibrium such that  0− ≥ − for all  ∈  . From the definition
of an equilibrium, we know that for all 
(−) ≥ (0−) (10)
Furthermore,  is non-increasing in its second argument, because a larger value im-
plies smaller odds of obtaining a positive payoﬀ. Therefore,
(0−) ≥ (0 0−) (11)
Combining the last two expressions hands the result.
This completes our verification that the results shown in Section 3 are qualitatively
robust. We shall now explore some of their main ramifications for public policy.
5 Some policy implications
The existence of an ecological threshold, and the fact that its exact level is un-
certain, raise specific policy issues. An important one is whether to then adopt
precautionary measures. The feasibility and social desirability of such actions have
been widely debated in policy circles and remain an active research topic (see, e.g.,
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Wiener 2010, Barrieu and Sinclair-Desgagné 2006, and the references therein). In the
present context, choosing a precautionary stance would mean to avoid claiming nat-
ural capital beyond the lowest possible threshold, in order to safeguard those vital and
irreplaceable ecological services. Contrary to the current literature, which assumes a
benevolent planner or representative agent with the proper kind of risk or ambiguity
aversion, proposition 1 above shows that this outcome can actually be achieved in a
decentralized fashion: it corresponds to what we called a ‘cautious’ equilibrium.
Propositions 2 and 3 entail, moreover, that precautionary outcomes would arise
rather naturally as a result of fostering communication and collaboration between
agents, since cautious equilibria are robust to group deviations (hence are also Pareto
optimal) while dreadful equilibria are not and dangerous equilibria may not.
There is, however, one caveat to proposition 3 which is worth mentioning. In that
proposition, the coalition which departs from the dangerous equilibrium, thereby
implementing a precautionary outcome, bears all the cost while outsiders retain their
initial claim (which will moreover materialize with certainty). This could create
an incentive for agents to stick to their original request and free-ride on deviating
coalitions, so dangerous equilibria might not be that vulnerable after all. One way
around this situation is to seek a grand coalition in which everybody settles for less
natural capital. This is the approach chosen notably in the post-Kyoto negotiations
over national reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. It might be the only sensible
one when agents are fairly similar in their respective preferences and requests, but the
eﬀort then spent in drawing everybody together might be daunting. Alternatively, if
there is ‘enough asymmetry’ between agents at some dangerous equilibrium outcome 
(but not too much, in light of the discussion that follows example 2 above), a coalition
of the willing, ready to implement a precautionary outcome, might come about as
follows. Using proposition 3’s notation, let  −  be the certainty equivalent for
agent , so  is the positive quantity such that ( −  ) = (). The idea
is to target the agents with the largest  , in order to subsequently have them
give up an amount of natural capital  =  −  where  is a small positive
number. These agents will typically combine relatively high risk aversion with large
claims on ecological services. Suppose they form a strict subgroup  ⊆  such
that
P
∈
  1 − . If, in addition, the magnitude of their potential to sacrifice
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would make their individual participation essential in any successful group deviation,
then they might well choose to collectively move ahead in deviating to a cautious
equilibrium.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the behavior of rational agents sharing a non-excludable
ecosystem that may not deliver some key services beyond an uncertain ecological
threshold. We modelled this situation as a version of the well-known ‘Divide-the-
dollar’ game in which the amount to be split follows a discrete probability distribution.
This brought two new insights for the economics of common-pool resources. First,
strategic interaction can have much more impact on the outcome than individual fea-
tures: whatever the agents’ respective degree of risk aversion, for instance, ‘cautious’
equilibria - where agents altogether behave as if the lowest (and safest) threshold were
certain - were found to coexist with ‘dangerous’ equilibria - where the agents’ request
of ecological services up to a higher threshold might lead to an ecosystem breakdown
- and even ‘dreadful’ equilibria - where so much natural capital is claimed collectively
that no single player’s actions can prevent its exhaustion. Second, allowing agents to
cooperate and form deviating coalitions would eliminate all dreadful equilibria and
several dangerous equilibria, while cautious equilibria were shown to be robust to such
deviations. These results support the emphasis currently put by the common-pool
resources literature on social capital, governance and institutions. The latter also
captures the recurrent empirical observation that some resource-sharing communities
were able to avoid a tragedy of the commons through communication and cooperation
(Ostrom 1999); its derivation indicates, moreover, which dangerous equilibria will be
discarded and which situation a successful deviating coalition will then prefer.
The above analysis and conclusions may first apply to other contexts as well.
Abusing natural capital might trigger severe social unrest instead or in addition of a
loss of ecological services (as in Diamond 2005’s tale of the Mayas collapse through
drought and warfare), for instance, or the agents’ actions might directly encroach on
social (rather than natural) capital until some uncertain borderline is crossed and
civil war erupts (as in André and Platteau 1998’s account of the rising tensions in
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social and family relations that increasing land scarcity engendered in the eighties in
Rwanda, which partly paved the way to the bloody civil war that broke out in 1994.)
Another immediate step from this paper, considering the relative simplicity of
the present game, would be to check whether the above results hold as well in the
laboratory. In such a setting, we expect the presence of focal points, or the subjects’
usual preference for equality and fairness (as reported in Ostrom 2000), to then reduce
the initial sets of equilibria but also aﬀect the extent to which deviating coalitions
may form. Other theoretical insights could additionally be obtained by relaxing some
informational assumptions. For example, agents might be allowed to hold diﬀerent
beliefs about the location and distribution of thresholds or have access (at some cost)
to a privately observable warning signal (of the type discussed, say, in Scheﬀer et
al. 2009). The issue of asymmetric information has already been considered in the
common-pool resource literature (see, e.g., Lindahl and Johannesson 2009, and the
references therein), but not with various discrete thresholds or when the distribution
of thresholds is multimodal, as above. Finally, one should examine rigorously how
agents communicate and coordinate with each other. To be sure, for the above
equilibrium outcomes to locate where potential thresholds precisely lie, some means
of coordination must exist (particularly in large-scale natural commons, such as open
seas or the earth atmosphere). It would be worthwhile to investigate what they are,
and to explore when and how they can support cooperation.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Let  ∈ 1 , we start by proving that the set  := { ∈ R+|¯( − ) 
max 6= ¯(( − )+)} is convex subset of [0 [. This follows from the concavity of
 and the fact that the sequence of ¯’s is decreasing:
i) First, notice that  ⊆ [0 [, because −−  0 on this set only, and agents
are not allowed to demand negative amounts of ecological services.
ii) For all   , the expression ¯(− )− ¯(( − )+) is decreasing in  on
[0 ]. Therefore { ∈ [0 ]|¯( − ) ≥ ¯( − )} is convex.
iii) For all   , the expression ¯(( − )+) − ¯( − ) is increasing on
[0 ]. Moreover, ¯( − )  ¯(( − )+) = 0 on [ ]. Hence, { ∈
[0 ]|¯( − ) ≥ ¯( − )} is also convex.
It follows from the convexity of the intersection of convex sets that the set  is
convex, for all . Moreover, point iii) implies that  ≤  for all   , so that the
’s are in the natural order.
Finally, denoting ¯−1 and ¯+1 the lower and upper bounds of the set , respec-
tively, yields the result.
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